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Summary 
The framework set out in this paper provides guidance for auditing the performance of 
regulators in regard to the compliance costs they impose on business and other 
regulated entities. It complements other frameworks that are used to assess the 
performance of regulators in regard to their efficiency and effectiveness, and processes 
for ex ante assessment of the impact of proposed regulations. The framework should 
be applied within institutional arrangements that establish the authority, resources, and 
mechanisms to hold regulators to account. 
For audits to improve regulator performance in this regard they need to: 
• develop an audit plan in consultation with business and other stakeholders. This 
document should set out how the regulator will reduce compliance costs (good 
practice indicators), and how their achievement of this objective will be assessed 
(metrics) 
• reward good performance and sanction poor performance 
• comply with, and report against, the high level principles for good performance  
• be public documents, with the audit plans and reports made available on the 
regulator’s website. 
In order for the audits to be undertaken in an effective and efficient way they should: 
• focus on the principles and particular areas of regulator behaviour that have the 
greatest effect on the cost of compliance for businesses they regulate — these will 
differ across regulators 
• select good practice indicators that best reflect regulator behaviour that minimises 
compliance costs while still achieving the objectives of the regulation 
• provide metrics at the highest level possible to demonstrate the satisfaction of the 
principle or indicator, utilising data and information from existing sources where 
available 
• require auditors to ‘triangulate’ information in forming a view of the satisfactory 
achievement of a principle 
• be included as a separate module in external audits that examine broader areas of 
performance of the regulator and regulation. 
As part of the broader system that promotes regulation reform and reduces regulatory 
burden, oversight is needed to: 
• ensure that audit plans are prepared and that both plans and audit reports are 
published 
• coordinate the development of audit plans and audits to minimise the costs to 
business of participating in the process, and prioritise resources to where the 
potential for improvement is greatest  
• facilitate feedback on the quality of the regulations and need for reform 
• publish a report card facilitating comparison of the performance of regulators and 
lessons on approaches that have worked well in reducing compliance costs.  
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1 Introduction 
This document sets out a framework that can be used to evaluate the performance of 
government regulators in regard to the compliance costs their behaviour imposes on 
the entities they regulate. It complements the Australian National Audit Office 
(ANAO) framework developed to audit the performance of regulators in regard to 
their administrative efficiency and their effectiveness in achieving the objectives of 
the regulation. This framework has been produced in response to a commitment by 
the Federal Government that the Productivity Commission develop such a 
framework, and that the Office of Best Practice Regulation (OBPR) use the 
framework to audit the performance of Commonwealth Government regulators at 
least once each parliamentary term (Liberal Party of Australia 2013, p. 22). This is 
part of the deregulation agenda of the Government, which seeks to lower cost, 
simplify regulation, and promote the use of non-regulatory solutions. 
The need for an additional process to audit regulator performance reflects ongoing 
concerns that it is the way some regulators interact and engage with businesses and 
other regulated entities1 on a day to day basis that is responsible for much of 
the unnecessary cost imposed by regulation. For example, concerns have been 
raised by the Government about: 
… many instances of regulators providing incorrect and inconsistent guidance and 
advice. This poor advice results in businesses having to pay costly fees for consultants 
or accountants to navigate the maze of regulation. At times, this has also resulted in 
businesses or individuals finding themselves subject to legal proceedings or penalties 
for actions, which they took in good faith, based on advice about regulatory 
requirements provided to them by bureaucrats who later turned out to be mistaken. 
(ibid, p. 21) 
Similar concerns relating to regulators’ interaction with business were raised in a 
recent Commission study (PC 2013). Concerns were raised about the culture of 
regulators, and the extent to which the culture espoused by leaders flowed through 
to implementation ‘on the ground’. It was found that regulator behaviour can 
potentially have as large an effect on the compliance costs for business as the 
regulations themselves.  
                                              
1 Other regulated entities includes not-for-profit organisations, and individuals to the extent that 
they are the directly regulated entity (such as with tax returns). 
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As a result, there is a case to consider adding an additional element into audits of 
regulator performance, that focuses on the way in which regulators interact with 
businesses.  
Regulators can also play a role in improving the regulation they administer where 
they have the discretion to do so, and through the advice they provide to their policy 
department about the need for, and effectiveness of, the legislation. 
Where does the PC audit framework fit in? 
While existing audit processes address important questions such as the 
administrative efficiency of the regulator and the achievement of regulatory 
outcomes, there is no systematic process by which the costs that regulators impose 
on business are assessed ex post (see table 1). The proposed framework is designed 
to bridge this gap. It does not provide a guide to measuring the compliance costs, 
rather it takes a principles based approach. Adherence to these well-established 
principles should ensure that regulators are administering their regulations in a way 
that imposes least cost on business while still achieving the objectives of the 
regulation. 
The framework set out in this paper is tightly focused on the performance of 
regulators in regard to compliance costs for business that are the result of the way in 
which the regulations are administered. It complements the ANAO’s Better 
Practice Guide: Administering Regulation, which is currently being updated. This 
guide and the ANAO’s pilot project The Australian Government Performance 
Measurement and Reporting Framework cover a much wider set of issues, 
including the organisational efficiency of the regulator, and the effectiveness of the 
regulation (whether it achieves its objectives).  
The implementation of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability 
(PGPA) Act 2013 will introduce new reporting requirements for regulators and 
departments. The form these will take is being developed by the Department of 
Finance. It is envisaged that reporting against the framework set out in this paper 
will form an input into this broader reporting process. 
There are several other processes that may consider the costs that regulations 
impose on business. All new Commonwealth regulation that is expected to have a 
significant impact on business is required to have a regulatory impact assessment by 
the OBPR, and the states have similar requirements. However, ex-post, there is 
rarely a requirement to review the compliance costs on business. Audits of 
regulators by the ANAO, Departmental reviews (including those related to 
sunsetting legislation), and other ad hoc reviews could be asked to consider 
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including compliance costs. This could be part of examining whether the regulation 
is efficient, effective and necessary.2  
Together these processes, set out in table 1, form the basis of the whole of 
government risk-management framework in regard to regulation. The framework 
presented in this paper is only a small part of this broader framework. Previous 
Commission reports have pointed to areas that need strengthening or where gaps 
remain. In particular the regulatory impact statement process, while sound on paper, 
was found to be less than ideal in practice (PC 2012), and processes for dealing with 
reviewing regulation (management of the stock of regulation) could be strengthened 
and gaps addressed (PC 2011). These issues are considered further in chapter 3 of 
this paper. 
Table 1. Outline of processes to manage the risk of poor regulation 
 
Assessment focus 
 
Key issues 
Processes and responsible 
entities 
Regulation design and 
development 
Are the regulatory objectives 
in the public interest?  
Are regulations the best way 
of achieving the regulatory 
objectives? 
Are regulations designed and 
implemented to allow 
compliance at least cost? 
Policy departments, Office of 
Best Practice Regulation  
Regulatory Impact Statement 
(RIS) process for regulations 
that have a non-minor impact 
on businesses, not-for-profit 
organisations and the 
community 
Administration of the 
regulation 
Is the regulator efficient? 
Is there an unnecessary 
burden on businesses and 
other regulated entities? 
Departmental and ANAO 
Audits 
Currently there is no 
systematic approach to 
auditing compliance costs 
Regulatory outcomes Are regulatory objectives 
being achieved? 
Are they being achieved at 
least cost? 
ANAO Performance Audits 
Ad hoc Departmental reviews 
Regulatory impact Is the regulation in the public 
interest? (cost-benefit test) 
Ad hoc review processes, 
such as Productivity 
Commission Inquires 
Sunsetting requirements 
overseen by Attorney 
Generals 
 
                                              
2 The on-going need for regulation is often not adequately challenged in many audit processes, in 
part as this requires a comprehensive ex post evaluation of the primary legislation (PC 2012). 
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As mentioned, the framework does not provide a method for estimating compliance 
costs. A guide to the estimation of the compliance costs of regulation (including the 
standard cost calculator tool) is already available from OBPR. Rather the 
framework aims to provide the basis of an ongoing process to build incentives for 
regulators to minimise the costs they impose on business (subject to regulatory 
effectiveness), and enhance their capacity to do so. 
What are the objectives, outcomes and potential benefits? 
The objective of the framework is to provide a platform for comprehensive 
assessment of individual regulators performance in regard to their interaction and 
engagement with businesses. The framework is intended to be adaptive to account 
for differences in the scope and scale of activities conducted by regulators. By 
providing a clear guide to practices that should minimise the compliance costs the 
regulator imposes, the application of the framework should give both guidance to 
the regulator on how to behave, and supply a way to assess their performance in 
regard to unnecessary compliance costs. 
Successful implementation of the framework should ensure that good regulator 
practices are rewarded and encouraged, while bad practices are identified and 
discouraged. Improved regulator practices should avoid unnecessary compliance 
costs for businesses, and potentially lower administrative costs for regulators, 
without compromising regulatory outcomes.3 Broader benefits to the economy 
(beyond lower administration and business compliance costs) can also be expected 
if successful implementation of the framework leads to improved regulatory 
outcomes. This will depend, in part, on the scope the regulator has, and/or the 
willingness of the policy department, to act on any suggestions for regulatory 
reform.  
What are the potential costs? 
The costs of introducing a new process for auditing regulator performance could be 
substantial for both regulators and the auditor. Additional costs to business (or their 
representative bodies) can also be expected. The need to minimise these costs — 
particularly those associated with implementing and operating the framework — is 
of primacy in the current budget circumstances, and more generally from an 
efficient government perspective.  
                                              
3 To the extent that regulators set fees based on cost recovery, their administrative efficiency also 
has impacts on business. As administrative efficiency is audited by ANAO and overseen by the 
policy departments, it is outside the scope of the audit framework set out in this paper. 
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To help reduce costs the framework is designed to utilise available information, and 
only require the collection of new information where essential. Drawing on 
structured hypothesis testing methods, it adopts a hierarchical approach to the 
choice of indicators used to assess regulator performance in order to streamline the 
audit process and cut costs (Matthews and White 2013). 
The framework is designed to be flexible so that it can be applied by any regulator 
in developing their own plan for improvement. While such planning should be part 
of normal practice, involving stakeholders in this process does involve additional 
costs. Hence the use of the framework to develop a ‘audit plan’ should be phased in 
across regulators based on the potential for improvement and scope for behaviour 
change to reduce compliance costs. For regulators that already undertake regular 
self-assessment, they should be given time to transition to the adoption of the 
framework.  
External audit processes can be costly and need to be used judiciously. 
Governments should develop an overarching approach that combines annual 
regulator reports, and external audits that could be random or programmed. It is 
important to balance the incentives provided by external audits with the cost of 
these audit processes. As minimising the costs imposed on business is only one 
aspect of ensuring regulations are appropriate, efficient and effective, the 
application of this framework should, where possible, be undertaken as part of a 
process that considers these broader issues.  
As businesses are usually regulated by a number of different regulators, there may 
be cost savings by coordinating external audits of regulator behaviour. This can be 
important where there are considerable interactions in the nature of the regulations 
and compliance requirements across regulators. 
Implementation is critical 
The framework is only a component of the process needed to improve regulator 
performance. It must be applied within institutional arrangements that establish the 
authority, resources, and mechanisms to hold regulators to account. 
In light of some recent developments in this space (for example, the implementation 
of the PGPA Act, the establishment of Deregulation Divisions in each department, 
and new Government portfolio advisory groups), this paper also includes a chapter 
on how the proposed framework might be implemented in practice. Questions 
addressed include: 
• who undertakes the audits and how often they are undertaken 
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• how to ensure that the audits improve regulator performance, and provide 
feedback on the need for the regulation and better regulatory approaches  
• what processes ensure quality and reliability?  
While a number of implementation options are canvassed, adoption of the 
appropriate pathway will ultimately be a choice for the Government. However, the 
Commission is of the view that substantial departure from the structure outlined is 
not likely to prove beneficial.  
Essential components of a successful audit process 
The framework provides a set of best-practice principles against which the 
performance of each regulator should be assessed, along with a range of possible 
indicators and metrics that could be used to make these assessments. However, a 
successful audit process involves more than just the framework. Irrespective of who 
ultimately conducts the audit, success in improving regulator behaviour will depend 
on a number of important steps being taken: 
1. Establishment of an agreed set of indicators of good performance that are 
appropriate to each regulator. This is the population of the framework for each 
regulator depending on what is assessed as being the most important elements 
for their performance, and what are the best indicators or measures of their 
performance. This should be documented as an audit plan. It should form part of 
a regulator’s stated intent for administering their regulations in a way that 
imposes the least costs on business. Plans that set out the timing for review 
activities can facilitate business engagement in the audit process by giving 
considerable prior notice, while publishing the proposed measures of intended 
performance can invite greater business response. 
2. Collection of information and data on the chosen indicators. The audit plan 
should set out what data should be collected for annual reporting, as well as the 
form in which it should be collected and collated. Some data will need to be 
collected on an ongoing basis, other data and information can be collected at the 
time of an external audit. 
3. Conduct of an external audit. This involves:  
(a) any further data collection and consultation 
(b) drafting of a written assessment of the regulator’s performance against the 
best-practice principles  
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(c) validation that the indicators and assessment accurately reflect the most 
important aspects of regulator performance in regard to the costs they 
impose on business 
(d) publication of the audit report in a central location. 
While these steps mostly apply whether using the proposed framework or a key 
performance indicator (KPIs) approach, there are several fundamental differences 
between reporting on KPIs and a good audit process. The first is the flexibility in 
choosing the appropriate measures or indicators of achievement against each 
principle. Auditors should always have the option of collecting evidence beyond the 
agreed indicators, and of changing the emphasis on which principles are most 
relevant for performance assessment. The second difference is that even if the 
regulator self–reports against their audit plan, in an audit there has to be an external 
oversight and confirmation process to validate the assessment (step 3c). Where for 
cost reasons this is not possible, the threat of a random external audit can provide an 
incentive for an honest self-assessment and reporting. Publication of the both the 
annual reporting and audit report also allows for external scrutiny. 
Having an audit plan prepared upfront is important. It is a way for the regulator to 
commit to good (and improved) performance. It sets out how the regulator will 
conduct themselves in relation to their engagement with business, as well as how 
they will demonstrate they have achieved their intentions. It could form part of a 
statement of intent by the regulator. The audit plan also sets out what data and 
information needs to be collected so that relevant information is available for annual 
reporting and when the time comes for an external audit. Lack of data in an 
accessible form is a major impediment to ex-post review, and having an audit plan 
is a way to overcome this common limitation. 
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2 Regulator audit framework 
The core of the regulator audit framework (‘the framework’) presented in this 
chapter is a set of high level principles and good practice indicators establishing the 
standards of behaviour expected of regulators in the way they engage and interact 
with businesses and other regulated entities. It is against these principles and 
indicators of good practice that the performance of individual regulators should be 
assessed. Adherence to these principles and appropriate good practices should result 
in regulators minimising the compliance costs they impose on businesses while still 
achieving the objectives of the regulation. 
It is envisaged that the framework will be used by regulators to develop an ’audit 
plan’. The indicators set out in the plan can form part of the regulator’s annual 
reporting requirements under the PGPA Act. In addition to covering the principles, 
the plan should identify the areas of regulatory actions that impose the greatest 
burdens on the businesses they regulate. These areas of greatest concern to 
businesses should provide a focus for the development of good practice indicators. 
The audit plan, setting out the good practice indicators and how they will be 
measured, and the data collected for annual reporting on the indicators will form the 
basis of external audits of the regulator’s performance in regard to compliance 
costs. As mentioned, auditors should have the flexibility to adapt the audit plan 
should they feel that it does not adequately reflect the factors influencing the aspects 
of regulator behaviour that affect businesses.  
It should be noted that assessment of the effectiveness of regulations in achieving 
the policy objectives and the appropriateness of their objectives are matters for 
policy departments and relevant Ministers. And while some regulators have 
considerable scope to develop regulations within their legislative remit, this process 
is subject to the same disciplines as regulation developed by policy departments 
(see figure 1). Consequently assessment of the appropriateness and effectiveness of 
the regulation falls outside the scope of this framework. Nevertheless, as the 
proposed audits could generate useful feedback on these two broader issues, the 
provision of such feedback, and action by regulators where they have the scope to 
review their own regulations, is included in the reporting requirements.  
While the audits of regulator performance derived from the framework could stand 
alone, they should sit within a broader audit process that also covers the 
administrative efficiency of the regulator and the achievement of regulatory 
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objectives. Regulatory appropriateness and design is best reviewed as a separate 
exercise. Given the considerable potential gains from improving regulator’s 
attention to compliance costs, the application of this framework should not be 
impeded if other audit processes do not proceed.  
Source of the principles 
The principles reflect widely held views about good regulator practice and 
behaviour that have been identified and advocated by the Commission following a 
number of public inquiries and studies into government regulation, including studies 
of regulatory burden, regulatory impact and regulatory reform. The principles are 
consistent with the ANAO’s Administering Regulation Better Practice Guide 
(ANAO 2007). While a few overlap with the Better Practice Checklist most are at a 
finer level of detail as they apply directly to compliance costs to business. The 
principles are also consistent with those established in the United Kingdom 
Government’s ‘Hampton Report’, which was published in 2005 and subsequently 
used to assess regulator performance in that country. The Victorian Competition 
and Efficiency Commission is assessing state government regulators using a similar 
framework.  
The principles of good regulator practice that are developed in this framework 
reflect important elements of ‘best practice’ behaviour that should arguably be 
found in any institution, public or private.  
The best practice principles emphasised in the framework are those that minimise 
the costs of achieving regulatory objectives. They also promote efficiency and 
effectiveness. They are: 
• clear and effective communication 
• risk-based requirements and proportionate actions 
• consistency in decision making, the application of rules, and engagement with 
clients or stakeholder 
• accountability and transparency in actions  
• a commitment to continuous improvement, including acting on findings in 
regard to the need for and effectiveness of the regulation.  
These five principles reflect the Government’s deregulation policy objectives. 
Application of the framework should address the Government’s objectives of 
adopting a consistent approach to regulatory compliance and risk management, and 
reducing regulatory uncertainty. This includes providing consistent advice and 
guidance, ensuring transparency and accountability in decision making, adopting a 
   
 THE FRAMEWORK 13 
 
risk-based approach to compliance obligations and enforcement, and more generally 
adopting approaches, processes and communication practices that minimise 
regulatory burden and maximise clarity and transparency.  
Areas of regulator interaction 
The principles of good regulatory practice have been organised into four main 
interaction themes or areas, reflecting the primary activities of regulators: 
1. Providing advice and guidance 
2. Conducting licensing and approvals processes 
3. Carrying out monitoring and compliance activities 
4. Undertaking enforcement actions for non-compliance. 
While separate evaluations of regulator performance against the principles 
associated with each of the four interaction areas is suggested, the relative 
importance of the different interaction areas is likely to vary across regulators. 
Where this is the case, audit teams should prioritise and allocate resources 
accordingly. 
An additional area of interaction for regulators is with the policy department that 
develops the regulations. Independent regulators are likely to have greater scope to 
interpret the primary legislation and quasi-legislation than regulators within a policy 
department who may look to their department for interpretation. Similarly, some 
regulators play a significant role in the development of new regulations. Hence the 
scope for regulators to develop or redesign regulation to meet the objectives in a 
lower cost way will vary. Good communication between policy departments and the 
regulator, and a clear understanding of the scope regulators have to act, is needed to 
ensure cost-effective regulation. 
Indicators of good practice 
The indicators of good practice set out in the framework play two roles. The first 
role is to guide regulators in how best to minimise the compliance costs imposed 
while still achieving compliance. Many will also improve compliance, such as when 
the regulator makes it is easier for a business to know what they need to do to be 
compliant. While the indicator list provided in this framework is not exhaustive, it 
covers most of the practices that have been found to be important in reducing the 
burden of compliance.  
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Not all practices and hence indicators will be relevant for all regulators. The audit 
plan provides an opportunity to identify those that are most relevant and to gain the 
regulators commitment to these good practices. Ultimately, each regulator should 
have their own audit plan and set of indicators that best reflect the aspects of their 
performance that the audit will assess then against.  
In making that assessment a ‘hierarchical’ approach to the indicators of good 
practice is suggested. That is, there are a number of overarching indicators within 
each interaction area. These can be used to assess the overall performance in each 
activity area. The overarching indicators are followed by good practice indicators, 
which link directly to specific actions that deliver on one of more of the principles. 
If audit teams conclude that the overarching indicators are clearly being met or 
achieved by the regulator, there is less need to continue to seek evidence on the 
remaining indicators. However, if the overarching indicators are not being met, or it 
is difficult to gather information about them directly, assessment of the good 
practice indicators will be necessary. While the audit plan should have set out those 
good practice indicators thought most relevant to the regulator, at the time of the 
audit, other good practice indicators may also be assessed.  
Identifying potential metrics  
The final step in developing the audit plan is identifying the particular metrics or 
measures that will reflect achievement of the chosen good practice indicators. In 
some cases, quantitative metrics may be useful for assessing regulators against the 
indicators, but in other instances, metrics will be of a qualitative nature and will 
require subjective judgements on the part of the audit team.  
The key question in developing metrics is to ask — how do you know if an 
indicator (commitment to a certain practice) is being achieved. For example, a good 
practice indicator is waiting times for approval of licences are minimised. The 
metric might be the median waiting time relative to a target (say of two days), 
where the target is set based on an achievable improvement over past performance. 
Alternatively, the metric might be to have 95 per cent of licences issued within four 
days of receipt of application. Regulators may set a metric for just one type of 
licence they issue that has been the one most subject to delays, or for all types. The 
framework does not go into details on appropriate metrics as they will vary with 
regulators and over time. 
Key stakeholders (including the regulator, the relevant policy department, and 
businesses or business representatives) should be involved in developing the audit 
plan. This plan can be developed by the regulator, the oversight department, or an 
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external audit team, but it must be agreed by the regulator and have the support of 
business. 
The metrics chosen should ideally reflect outcomes (for example, the regulator 
provides fast and accurate advice) rather than processes or outputs (the regulator has 
a website or call centre offering advice). However, where there is a clear and 
reliable link between the existence of a process and the achievement of a desired 
outcome, measures of process can be suitable.  
In developing the metrics it is important to start with what the desired good practice 
is, then to look for full or partial metrics of that outcome. Where only partial metrics 
are available, the potential need to supplement them, or confirm that changes in 
these measures over time will adequately reflect changes in the desired outcome, 
should be flagged in the audit plan.  
In developing the audit plan the risk of creating perverse incentives must be 
considered. Reflecting concerns with performance measurement frameworks, the 
audit framework presented here seeks to ensure that: 
• all areas thought relevant by the stakeholders are covered (to prevent regulators 
adapting their practices to meet indicators while neglecting areas that are more 
difficult to observe) 
• metrics are not easily subject to gaming or perverse incentives (to prevent 
targeting the reported measures rather than performance)  
• multiple sources of evidence are used to form a view on performance and areas 
for improvement (rather than a formulaic approach that adds performance 
measures to give a pass/fail type assessment). 
Sources of evidence 
The framework includes a section on sources of evidence for consideration when 
developing audit plans and conducting audits. This section provides advice as to 
what existing (and potentially what new) information sources could be considered 
in developing an agreed set of metrics that reflect good practice indicators, and in 
ensuring that audit conclusions about performance against the principles are robust. 
In general the audit should utilise existing data and information from the regulator 
and other sources. The use of existing resources will help to minimise the cost of 
the audits, as well as minimise the burdens on regulators and third parties, including 
regulated businesses. Some of the larger Commonwealth regulators have already 
made commitments to many of the good practices identified in this framework and 
have self-assessment processes in place. In developing the audit plans and in 
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undertaking the audits, the resources and outcomes of existing processes should be 
utilised to help reduce costs to all parties.  
Where it is necessary to gather new evidence to complete the audit this should be 
done at least cost. New data and information requirements will impose costs on 
regulators and regulated businesses, and in developing the audit plan consideration 
must be given as to whether the benefits from collecting new data outweigh the 
costs, including any costs imposed on businesses. The audit plan developed may 
suggest changes in the regulator’s data collection regime over time in order to make 
audits of the regulator more efficient. 
Since an important element of the audit process is to evaluate regulators’ 
engagement with business, mechanisms to seek feedback from businesses on their 
experiences with the regulator will be needed. These could include: 
• regulator’s complaints records 
• surveys of regulated businesses  
• consultation with industry associations 
• interviews/workshops/roundtables with regulated businesses 
• submissions. 
Consideration will have to be given to the most effective methods in each case, 
bearing in mind factors such as the: costs of collection; burden on participants; 
quality, quantity and representativeness of feedback or data; and time required to 
collect information.  
Outputs and outcomes of the audit process 
Written reports 
The output of each audit should be a written report that is made public. The report 
should document the audit process used to assess the regulator. Since the audit 
process will vary from regulator to regulator, consistent with selecting the most 
relevant indicators for each regulator, there will similarly be some variation in the 
content of each report. However, to facilitate collating measures of performance and 
comparisons across regulators there are a number of issues to consider in 
developing each report: 
• as far as practicable, reports should follow a standard outline. A suggested 
outline is provided at the end of this chapter (figure 2) 
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• reports should draw conclusions on the extent to which the regulator is achieving 
the five high level principles across each of the four areas of regulator 
interaction (adoption of an agreed three or five point scale can facilitate common 
reporting)  
• reports should highlight areas of good practice, as well as areas for development 
• where appropriate, reports should include recommendations on areas for 
improvement. This should include intended responses by the regulator in regard 
to their conduct and responses by the regulator and/or policy department to 
feedback on the regulations. Departmental and external audits (including audits 
of self-reports) should also provide advice and directions to the regulator for 
improvement, and any need for a follow-up activity 
• reports should be published.  
Note that if the audit process proposed in this chapter is instituted as an element of a 
wider review process (such as one that also addresses issues like the appropriateness 
of regulatory objectives and the achievement of regulatory outcomes), then the 
written assessment suggested in this paper would potentially represent one 
component of a more comprehensive report, rather than being a stand-alone report.  
The framework represents a process not a checklist 
The proposed framework is intended to support the preparation of objective and 
evidence-based written assessments of regulator performance. The agreed audit plan 
developed for each regulator should be viewed as a commitment to agreed good 
practice and not as a checklist. Also, a flexible and collaborative approach should be 
taken in both the development of the audit plan and the conduct of external audits in 
order to properly engage regulators and other stakeholders.  
The success of the audits will be measured by three things:  
• the extent to which the process reduces unnecessary compliance costs on 
business (without compromising regulatory objectives) and the cultural change 
that lies behind this 
• the extent to which regulators that are not achieving sufficiently high standards 
of behaviour are publicly identified and tasked with making improvements 
• the contribution that the audits make to identifying regulations in need of reform 
and inducing action. 
In addition, there can be value in sharing experiences so that practices that 
regulators find have worked well can be adopted more broadly. 
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Success will depend on all parties being committed to the process, along with 
adequate resourcing. It will also depend on the institutional arrangements that hold 
regulators to account, and those that recognise and reward good performance.  
Principles and indicators of good regulator practice 
While all the high level principles apply in each area of regulator activity, some are 
much more important for good practice than others across different areas. 
Continuous improvement is, however, critical in all areas.  
1 Advice and guidance 
Principles 
The most important principles for advice and guidance are clear and effective 
communication and consistency. Advice and guidance should be accurate, timely, 
consistent, clear, concise and accessible. Regulators should also take account of the 
risk associated with different sized businesses and different activities, and tailor 
their advice accordingly. 
Indicators of good practice 
Overarching indicators: 
• Businesses report a high level of satisfaction with the advice and guidance they 
receive. 
• Businesses report that the advice and guidance allows them to reduce or 
minimise the compliance burden they face. 
• Advice and guidance materials:  
– are written in plain language 
– include illustrative examples 
– are available in a variety of formats and 
languages that are consistent with business 
access requirements and characteristics. 
• With new regulation, guidance is issued prior to 
implementation.  
 
 
Clear and effective 
communication 
 
   
 THE FRAMEWORK 19 
 
• Firm-specific advice is provided where appropriate 
and cost effective. 
• Advice and guidance services take into account 
business size and industry. 
 
Risk-based and 
proportionate 
• Regulators monitor the consistency of advice 
provided, and take action to avoid inconsistencies.  
Consistency 
• Advice and guidance functions within the 
regulator are separated from enforcement 
functions. 
 
Accountability and 
transparency 
• Feedback is regularly sought from business to: 
– ensure business understand regulatory 
requirements 
– identify any areas where guidance and advice is 
unclear or inconsistent 
– improve and further refine advice and 
guidance, and to update materials. 
• The regulator provides training to staff to improve 
advice and guidance services. 
 
Continuous improvement 
For more information on the derivation and interpretation of both the principles and 
indicators of good practice in relation to the provision of advice and guidance, see 
PC 2013 chapters 5 & 6, and NAO-BRE 2008, phase 2, guidance 6. 
2 Licensing and approvals 
Principles 
The most relevant high-level principles are clear and effective communication, 
risk-based and proportionate requirements and assessments, and accountable and 
transparent decisions. To minimise the cost to businesses of attaining the required 
licenses and approvals regulators must communicate the information needs clearly 
and collect only the information required in the most cost-effective way possible. 
Decisions on licences and approvals must be timely, transparent and consistent, and 
regulators held accountable through independent dispute resolution processes. 
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Indicators of good practice 
Overarching indicators: 
• Businesses report a high level of satisfaction with licensing and approvals 
processes. 
• Businesses report that the time periods involved in decision making processes 
are acceptable, and that they understand the options available to them in relation 
to the review of decisions. 
• The regulator publishes information on licensing and 
approval processes in plain language.  
• Licensing, registration, and other processes and 
requirements are simple and streamlined (for example the 
number of licences is rationalised or combined when 
feasible).  
• The regulator provides a range of options for businesses to 
submit applications and provide data (such as via mail, fax, 
phone, or online). 
• Only information required for the purpose of licensing and 
approval is collected from businesses.  
• The regulator does not collect the same information more 
than once.  
• The regulator informs businesses of the purpose(s) for 
which they collect data. 
• Regulator requests for information are clear and targeted. 
• Time periods for administrative decisions (such as an 
approval or licence applications) are published and easy to 
understand. 
• The regulator shares data with other regulators, and has 
processes in place to establish whether data are held 
elsewhere. 
  
Clear and 
effective 
communication 
• A risk-assessment is used to determine the level of 
information required. 
• The process for design of information and data collection 
used by the regulator is based on cost benefit analysis, 
internal challenge (for example, a gatekeeper) and 
consultation with businesses. 
  
Risk-based and 
proportionate 
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• Decision making processes for licensing and approvals are 
transparent, and decisions made are documented with 
reasons. 
• The regulator has a dispute resolution process with scope 
for independent dispute resolution. 
   
Accountable 
and transparent 
• The regulator seeks regular feedback from business and 
other regulators on the information required and licensing 
and approval processes to: 
– ensure that only necessary information is sought 
– improve and refine licensing and approval design 
– ensure that opportunities to share and/or obtain 
information from other regulators are maximised 
– help train staff in licensing and approval processes. 
• Cooperative and collaborative arrangements are established 
with business or business groups to build trust and improve 
efficiency, including, where appropriate, through 
recognition of industry accreditation schemes. 
 
Continuous 
improvement 
For more information on the derivation and interpretation of both the principles and 
indicators of good practice in relation to licencing and approvals processes, see 
PC 2013 chapters 4 and 6, NAO-BRE 2008 phase 2, guidance 7, ANAO 2007 
chapter 6. 
3 Monitoring and compliance 
Principles 
The most important high level principle to minimise the cost of monitoring and 
compliance while achieving the objectives of the regulation is for the regulator to 
apply a risk-based and proportionate approach. ‘Light-handed’ approaches, 
including allowing businesses flexibility in how they meet their compliance 
obligations, should be taken where possible. The requirements must be 
communicated clearly and risk assessment processes and inspection methodologies 
must be transparent and accountable. 
An important part of a regulator’s job is to assess the risks — both the level of harm 
that would arise and the probability of the event causing harm. In setting priorities 
for the sources of risks they will target they also need to take into account the 
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likelihood that compliance with the regulations will actually reduce the probability 
of events and/or the harm associated with an events. 
A brief outline of some common strategies to risk-based monitoring and compliance 
is provided in box 1. The good practice indicators do not specify which approach 
regulators should take as detailed approaches and hence the development of specific 
indicators are best left to experts in the individual areas. 
A risk-based approach means that regulators will face a risk that some businesses 
may not comply with consequent costs for the community. How much risk the 
community should bear — that something will happen that the regulation was 
designed to prevent — is ultimately a political decision. There is a risk-cost 
trade-off, and regulators should be provided with guidance from the Minister on 
what risk the Minister is prepared to accept. That said, in developing regulations 
and important part of the RIS process is to assess this risk-coat trade-off and 
determine what is in the best interest of the public. To the extent that regulators are 
responsible for developing regulations they should address this issue within the RIS 
process.  
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Box 1 Risk-based approaches for regulators 
The aim of risk-based approaches for regulators is to reduce the cost, to the regulator 
and to the businesses they regulate, of ensuring compliance (to the point where the 
compliance costs are commensurate with the benefits of the risks being mitigated). The 
main elements of a risk-based approach for regulators are: 
• adopting an ‘expert’ rather than ‘legal’ model of regulation where appropriate — this 
means relying on judgment about what is harmful (through a structured approach to 
risk assessment) more than rules about what is legal  
• focusing on identifying and reducing ‘bads’ (risks/harms) rather than on defining and 
promoting ‘goods’ — although not at the cost of poor communication to business of 
what is required to comply with regulation 
• using a broad range of tools and selecting those most suited to the task — this 
could include ‘hard’ tools (such as fines and cease and desist orders) but used with 
discretion rather than widely applied, as well as ‘soft’ tools such as educative 
approaches, and ‘deemed to comply’ guidelines 
• taking an outcomes focused rather than a program focused approach — this means 
focusing on non-compliant businesses and activities, on the areas of 
non-compliance within programs that impose the greatest harm and pose the 
greatest risk, and seeking the least cost solutions to specific problems (such as 
taking a case management approach, and an escalation model of enforcement) 
• matching the regulatory structure to the types of risks being addressed (structural 
versatility) — for example, ‘light-handed’ or ‘self-regulation’ approaches, where the 
regulator monitors behaviour and imposes controls only for breaches of good 
behaviour, can work well where the businesses are happy to disclose and 
imposition of controls is a credible threat 
• developing partnerships with industry, community groups, and other regulators 
based around common risk mitigation objectives — other bodies may provide much 
more cost effective ways to manage risk where it is in their interests to do so. 
Industry self-regulation may be effective in some cases, community organisations 
can provide low cost monitoring of compliance and the threat of consumer sanctions 
may be sufficient discipline to ensure compliance 
• understanding the types of risk that pose special challenges and need special 
approaches and attention. These include: 
– high level harms — low probability catastrophes 
– slow acting harms — where the effects are cumulative  
– invisible harms — unreported and/or unreportable 
– subordination of risk by businesses — where they can pass risk onto others (who 
may or may not be aware of the risks), or the pay-off to the business of ignoring 
or even assuming the regulated risk is ‘worth the risk’. 
Sources: Adapted from Sparrow, 2013, see also OECD 2010, chapter 6, PC 2013 appendix B.  
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Indicators of good practice 
Overarching indicators: 
• Businesses report that the burden of inspections or other regulatory compliance 
requirements is proportionate to the risk. 
• There is a high level of voluntary compliance. 
• The principles of risk assessment models are readily 
available and easy to understand. 
• Clearly specifies ‘deemed to comply’ solutions for 
businesses that do not have the capacity to develop 
alternative solutions. 
• The regulator notifies businesses in advance of an 
inspection, where appropriate, and provides information to 
help businesses to meet their obligations. 
• The regulator provides advice and feedback to inspected 
businesses. 
 
Clear and 
effective 
communication 
• Where regulators develop regulations, an assessment of the 
risk-cost trade-off is undertaken and always included in any 
RIS prepared by regulators 
• Subject to achieving the regulatory objectives, the 
regulator’s processes  
– allow businesses flexibility in how they meet their 
compliance obligations 
– encourage self-regulation 
– utilise joint or coordinated inspections with other 
regulators. 
• In conducting monitoring and compliance activities: 
– inspections are targeted on high risk areas of operation 
– low risk (low-impact/low-likelihood) businesses are not 
typically inspected 
– some inspections occur on a random or routine basis to 
test the risk based approach 
– compliance history is taken into account, with compliant 
businesses visited less frequently. 
– Inspectors are adequately trained 
  
Risk based and 
proportionate 
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• The regulator seeks regular feedback on its inspection and 
monitoring regime to inform continuous improvement in its 
compliance and inspection strategies. 
• The regulator engages with business on options to reduce 
costs such as ‘deemed to comply’ and industry 
self-regulation. 
• The regulator provides training to regulatory staff in 
applying its risk based approach to monitoring and 
inspections. 
  
Continuous 
improvement 
Identifying the nature and level of risk associated with particular activities and with 
individual businesses can be a complex task, and the right approach will vary across 
regulators and the entities being regulated. Some high level guidance to risk-based 
approaches has previously been provided by the Commission (see for example PC 
2013 chapters 5 and 6, appendix D). Other sources of advice on risk-based 
approaches are NAO-BRE 2008, phase 2 guidance 7 and 8, ANAO 2007, chapter 7, 
OECD 2010, Sparrow 2011. 
4  Enforcement 
Principles 
The most important high-level principles for enforcement are consistency, 
accountability and transparency and a risk-based and proportionate approach. To 
achieve this a graduated approach to enforcement using tools that are suitable and 
proportionate to different types of noncompliance is required (figure 1). Decision 
making processes must be clear, transparent, and easy to understand. Appropriate 
and effective mechanisms for the audit of decisions and independent dispute 
resolution processes need to be in place. And to ensure compliance, persistent and 
significant noncompliance is punished and seen to be punished. 
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Figure 1 Graduated response to non-compliance 
 
Source: ANAO. Based on the enforcement pyramid in Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive 
Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 35. 
Indicators of good practice  
Overarching principles: 
• Businesses report that the range of sanctions that apply for noncompliance are 
proportionate to the risks of noncompliance. 
• Businesses report that sanctions are applied fairly and consistently by the 
regulator. 
 
• The regulator’s enforcement policy is easily available, easy 
to understand (in plain language) and well signposted. 
• The regulator makes businesses aware of the reasons why 
enforcement action is necessary. 
• Enforcement actions are followed up to ensure that 
businesses know what is expected of them. 
 
Effective 
communication 
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• The regulator ensures that regulatory staff undertake 
enforcement actions consistently ‘on the ground’ and that 
the actions are achieving regulatory objectives. 
• The application of enforcement actions is consistent and in 
accordance with published enforcement guidance. 
 
Consistency 
• The regulator has, and makes use of, a sufficient suite of 
regulatory tools in order to proportionately respond to 
compliance breaches (carrots and sticks). 
• Enforcement actions are proportionate to the seriousness or 
persistence of, and potential commercial gain from, 
compliance breaches. 
• Alternatives to formal sanctions are considered on a risk 
basis. 
• Businesses that are continuously noncompliant are 
appropriately sanctioned. 
• Businesses are given time to comply (other than in urgent 
cases). 
 
Risk-based and 
proportionate  
• The regulator avoids perverse incentives that might 
influence the choice of enforcement actions. 
• Time periods for administrative decisions (such as those 
relating to infringement processes) and achievement towards 
them are published. 
• Statistics about completed enforcement actions are collected 
by the regulator and publicly released. 
• Appeal avenues (both internal and external) exist for 
enforcement actions. 
 
Accountable 
and transparent 
• The regulator seeks regular feedback from business on its 
enforcement regime to inform continuous improvement in 
its enforcement strategies. 
• The regulator provides training to regulatory staff in 
applying the appropriate approach to enforcement 
 
Continuous 
improvement 
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For more information on the derivation and interpretation of both the principles and 
indicators of good practice in relation to enforcement activities, see PC 2013, 
chapter 6 and appendix F, NAO-BRE 2008, phase 2 Guidance 9, and ANAO (2007, 
chapter 8). 
Gathering evidence 
In some cases, quantitative metrics will be most useful for assessing regulators 
against the principles. In other instances evidence relating to individual indicators 
will be of a qualitative nature, and will require subjective judgements on the part of 
the audit team. 
Cross-checking different data sources 
Business feedback, administrative and other data from regulators, process audits, 
and synthetic analysis can be used to form a view on the performance of each 
regulator against any given indicator. In general, and in particular where subjective 
data (such as business feedback) is used, attempts should be made to ‘triangulate’ 
data, to ensure that the representative range of (reasonable) views are sought.  
Business feedback 
Given that the primary goal of the audit framework is to establish the extent to 
which regulators are interacting effectively and efficiently with business, a key 
source of information will be the opinion of the latter. To ensure views are 
representative, surveys should use a random sampling approach. However, 
self-selected views (as from a member survey or focus group) can still be very 
useful, particularly in identifying practices that have a significant impact only on a 
small share of businesses. Verification of the extent to which particular views are 
held should be part of the data collection design. 
Business representative groups that are conducting regular member surveys are a 
potential source of this information. Also, some regulators already seek feedback 
from business through their own surveys and information collection processes. To 
the extent that business feedback already exists (and is suitable for use in the audit) 
it will reduce the additional impost on businesses of conducting audits. In the 
absence of existing information, auditors will need to seek feedback from 
businesses directly. 
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When seeking the views of business the instrument (such as a survey, interview, or 
focus group) needs to provide clear information on what the regulator has control 
over in order for the responses to reflect the performance of the regulator (as 
opposed to the regulation). However, such instruments can also seek useful 
information on other aspects of a regulation, such as its effectiveness and 
appropriateness. Given the cost of data collection, and the value of context, the 
element on compliance costs is ideally incorporated in broader audit activities. 
The development of the audit plan should engage business to ensure that they are 
willing and able to provide the feedback on the good practice intent set out in the 
plan. 
Administrative data 
Administrative data collected by regulators is likely to be the source of some 
metrics necessary for audit. Examples of data that regulators may collect and collate 
include: 
• compliance rates 
• statistics on licensing and approvals processes, including time taken 
• statistics relating to data quality checks, completion error rates, complaints 
registers, dispute resolutions etc. 
• statistics on the number of breaches and enforcement actions  
• staff training statistics (numbers, expenditure, courses) 
• regulator operating costs. 
The audit plan should set out the administrative data that needs to be collected to 
ensure that the information can be made available at the time of the audit. Attention 
must be paid to how the data will be compiled as administrative data that have been 
collected on paper but are not available electronically is generally of limited use.  
Assessments of regulator processes 
Auditors will need to examine the key processes that regulators have in place — as 
documented and as implemented in practice. Websites can be examined for 
published information on a range of processes, including risk assessment models, 
enforcement strategies, and code(s) of practice. They can also be examined to assess 
the quality, clarity and accessibility of advice and guidance, and the extent to which 
businesses can interact with the regulator online.  
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Internal guidance and training documents can provide evidence of the extent to 
which regulatory staff are being appropriately trained in providing advice and 
guidance to businesses, or in conducting inspections/investigations. 
Where recent audits of regulator performance (or some of their main activities or 
processes), or of the regulation have been undertaken, the results could provide 
useful information and data for auditors.  
Synthetic analysis 
Auditors can generate estimates of business compliance costs and make qualitative 
assessments of other aspects of regulator behaviour and interaction through 
synthetic analysis. In this approach, the auditor (or a consultant acting on their 
behalf) acts as a standard business and simulates engagement or interaction with a 
regulator, such as going through the steps involved in making a licence application 
or applying for an approval or permit. Data and qualitative information about the 
experience — such as response turn-around times, or the time taken to acquire 
information or complete forms — is recorded and summarised. 
A limitation of this approach is that the data are not necessarily representative of the 
‘real world’ experience of businesses. (For more information, see PC 2008c, 
p. 208). 
Consultations with business, regulators, and policy departments 
Apart from the critical role that consultations with stakeholders will play in 
developing the audit plan specific to each regulator, the auditor should meet with 
stakeholders towards the end of the audit process to: 
• test the evidence on which assessments of performance have been made, and the 
overall assessment of regulator performance. For example, if assessments have 
been made using the traffic light signalling approach (green equals excellent, 
amber equals satisfactory, red equals unsatisfactory), final stakeholder 
consultations would provide an opportunity to assist the auditor determine the 
final report against the high level principles across each of the areas of regulator 
activity 
• propose ways in which regulator performance could be improved  
• identify any gaps in the assessment process and consider ways to address the 
problem if they compromise the usefulness of results  
• confirm the appropriateness of the indicators used and consider whether they 
should be retained or improved for future assessments.  
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Suggested report outline 
Figure 2 illustrates a suggested outline for the written report. As noted earlier, 
depending on how the audit process is implemented, the proposed report may be a 
stand-alone document, a chapter in the regulator’s annual report, or it may form one 
component of a broader audit of regulator performance that also examines the 
administrative efficiency of the regulator, the achievement of regulatory objectives 
and the design of the regulations. (Implementation issues are canvassed in more 
detail in chapter 3). 
Figure 2 Suggested outline for written assessments of regulator 
performance 
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Information sources and other references 
On the regulator performance framework, important reference and source 
documents include: 
• National Audit Office (UK) 2007, Hampton Implementation Reviews: Guidance 
for Review Teams, May. 
• National Audit Office (UK) 2008, Effective inspection and enforcement: 
implementing the Hampton vision in the Environment Agency, 
http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/03/EA_Hampton_report.pdf 
(accessed 8 October) March. 
• Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission 2011, Strengthening 
Foundations for the Next Decade: An Inquiry into Victoria’s regulatory 
framework, April. 
• Victorian Government 2012, Victorian Government response to the Victorian 
Competition and Efficiency Commission’s Final Report – Strengthening 
Foundations for the Next Decade: An Inquiry into Victoria’s regulatory 
framework, March, Department of Treasury and Finance, Melbourne. 
• Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance 2013, Guidelines for Preparing 
Reducing Red Tape Statements of Expectations for Regulators, January, 
Melbourne. 
Examples of regulator reviews conducted in the UK using the Hampton model can 
also be downloaded from the National Audit Office website (www.nao.org.uk). 
They include studies of the following regulators: Financial Services Authority; 
Food Standards Agency; Health and Safety Executive; and Office of Fair Trading. 
On the development of the principles of good regulator practice, relevant documents 
include: 
• Australian National Audit Office 2007, Administering Regulation: Better 
Practice Guide, March. 
• National Audit Office-Better Regulation Executive, 2008, Effective Inspection 
and Enforcement: implementing the Hampton vision in national regulators, 
Phase 2 Guidance for Review Teams, July 
• Office of Best Practice Regulation 2007, Best Practice Regulation Report 
2006-07, Annual Report Series, Productivity Commission, Canberra. 
• Productivity Commission 2013, Regulator Engagement with Small Business, 
Research Report, October, Canberra. 
• Productivity Commission 2012, Regulatory Impact Analysis: Benchmarking, 
Research Report, November, Canberra. 
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• Productivity Commission 2011, Identifying and Evaluating Regulation Reforms, 
Research Report, Canberra.  
• Regulation Taskforce 2006, Rethinking Regulation: Report of the Taskforce on 
Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business, report to the Prime Minister and the 
Treasurer, Canberra. 
Beyond these reports, the PC has published a number of studies examining the 
regulatory burdens on businesses, as well as a number of performance 
benchmarking studies of business regulation. They are all available as downloads 
from the PC’s website: www.pc.gov.au. 
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3 Institutional arrangements for 
implementing the framework 
The audit framework outlined in chapter 2 is designed to be independent of the 
institutional architecture within which the audits are conducted. However, the 
architecture is critical to the effectiveness of the audits in improving the 
performance of regulators. 
Current institutional arrangements 
The institutional architecture needs to assign responsibility for audit plans to be 
developed, and for regulators to be audited against these plans on a regular basis. To 
be effective in providing regulators with an incentive to improve their performance, 
sanctions and/or rewards are needed for good regulator performance/improvements 
in performance. The institutional architecture is critical in establishing these 
sanctions and rewards, that is, in ensuring accountability from regulators for their 
performance.  
The choice of institutional arrangements will in part be determined by the broader 
accountability and performance reporting mechanisms that are either already in 
place or are likely to be implemented in the near future. The Public Governance, 
Performance and Accountability (PGPA) Act 2013 is still in the implementation 
stage. A requirement under this Act is that Commonwealth entities (which includes 
Commonwealth regulators) prepare annual performance statements, and that these 
statements ‘provide information about the entity’s performance in achieving its 
purposes’. Given this, the regulator audit framework proposed in this paper could be 
seen as providing the basis for one element or module of the broader reporting 
requirements regulators face under this Act. For example, the framework could be 
incorporated into the Act either as a direct amendment to the Act, or it could form 
part of the (as yet undeveloped) rules relating to performance: s 102(g). 
   
 INSTITUTIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS 
35 
 
Other institutional developments  
In addition to their election commitment to audit the performance of government 
regulators, the current Government committed to a number of other initiatives 
relevant to the issue of regulatory burden on business. These include: 
• the issuing of Ministerial statements of expectation (SOEs) to the heads of 
Commonwealth regulatory agencies.  
• the establishment of deregulation units within each department and agency 
• requirements that each department and agency audit and quantify the cost to 
businesses and individuals of complying with regulation 
• the establishment of Ministerial Advisory Councils, consisting of industry 
stakeholders, for each Cabinet Minister 
These developments also have implications for the implementation of the proposed 
regulator audit framework, particularly the issuing of Ministerial SOEs. For 
example, ensuring some degree of consistency between SOEs for regulators and the 
principles of good practice used in the proposed regulator audit framework 
(effective communication, a risk-based approach to inspections, proportionate 
responses to compliance breaches etc.) could achieve greater commitment to the 
overall process, and enhance the prospects of achieving genuine improvements in 
regulator performance. 
The Government is in the process of developing a whole-of-government risk 
management framework. The critical element of any risk management framework is 
the recognition of the cost of managing risk relative to the benefits achieved. These 
benefits depend on the probability and cost associated with the risk and on the 
effectiveness of the efforts to reduce risk or to mitigate the costs should the risk 
eventuate. This audit framework, as it focuses on minimising the cost to businesses 
while achieving the objectives of the regulation, should support the adoption of a 
risk-based approach to enforcement and compliance by Commonwealth regulators 
that will form part of this broader risk management framework. 
Across many developed countries, there has been a tendency towards increasingly 
strong regulatory interventions to reduce risk to the public. In part this is because 
the demand for many of the things that regulation addresses, such as safety and the 
natural environment, tends to rise with income. But it is also due to false 
perceptions of risk, and a lack of understanding that many risks cannot be easily 
removed, and that attempts to reduce one risk can easily result in risk transfer rather 
than risk reduction (see for example, Bayer 1993, Graham and Weiner 1997).  
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As set out by the OECD (2010) a comprehensive approach to risk management 
would include: 
… comprehensive regulatory impact assessment of the full portfolio of impacts of risk 
reduction efforts; both ex ante (prospective) regulatory impact assessment to inform 
initial policy decisions, and ex post (retrospective) regulatory impact assessment to 
inform subsequent policy revisions and to improve ex ante assessment methodologies; 
even-handed use of regulatory analysis both to discourage undesirable policy proposals 
and to encourage desirable policy proposals; greater use of economic incentive 
instruments in regulation; and better coordination and oversight of risk regulation 
policies across agencies within each government, and across governments 
internationally. (p. 12). 
As summarised in table 1, Australian governments have a number of these elements 
in place already. However, Commission studies have found that not all regulatory 
impact assessments function as well as they should (PC 2012), and that gaps remain 
in ex post assessment of the need for and performance of regulations (PC 2011). 
Moreover, while Australia has been a leader in introducing risk-based approaches to 
regulation with many regulators adopting these approaches, there is still 
considerable scope for further improvement (box 2).  
Rigorous application of the framework set out in this paper should work to reduce 
unnecessary compliance costs. But more fundamental efforts will be required to 
ensure that regulation is only implemented and continued where the economic and 
social benefits exceed the costs, and that where this is the case the most cost 
effective approaches are applied. This will require a more informed conversation 
with the Australian public about what governments can do to manage risk and what 
it will cost, not just for government but to businesses and other regulated entities, 
and the public more generally. The costs are not only financial, but include ‘social’ 
costs such as curtailing individual freedoms and eroding personal responsibilities. 
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Box 2 Past Commission suggestions for strengthening the whole of 
government risk management framework for regulation 
The main elements of Australian government processes to ensure that regulation 
addresses real problems, is cost-effective, and pass a cost-benefit test and the need 
for improvements in each are as follows: 
• Developing new regulation: regulation that imposes a non-minor (check wording) 
cost on businesses, not-for-profit organisations or the community requires passing a 
cost-benefit test (is appropriate). The analysis, which includes consideration of 
regulatory options, is documented in a Regulation Impact Statement (RIS). 
Commission studies have found that RISs are often done after the decision on a 
regulation has been made, rather than being used to determine the appropriateness 
and effectiveness of the proposed regulation. Moreover exemptions have been 
granted for major pieces of legislation, some on the grounds that they are election 
commitments and so have been tested by the ballot box, which is a very blunt test. 
Such legislation is mean to be subject to a Post-Implementation Review, but the 
scope of such reviews does not appear to address appropriateness. 
• Administering a regulation: regulators are already subject to audits of their 
administrative efficiency, and regulatory effectiveness. The willingness of 
government to act on the recommendations of these audits determines their 
effectiveness in improving the performance of the regulator. A gap is the impact of 
the regulation on the costs imposed on regulated entities by how the regulation is 
administered. The framework developed in this paper is designed to fill this gap. 
• Reviewing the stock of regulation: Some regulation and quasi-regulation is subject 
to sunset provisions (in their legislation of the generis sunset provision that applies 
to quasi-regulation). Sunset provisions require that regulation be reviewed and 
rolled over or repealed. The Australian Government Legislative Instruments Act 
2003 provided for a staged introduction which should see 2014 have to review, 
remake or repeal a considerable volume of regulation. In 2012 the Commission 
recommended that departments utilise the opportunity to review primary legislation 
when sub-ordinate legislation was due to sunset, as a means of reviewing the stock 
of regulation. While the Legislative Instruments Amendment Bill of 2012 provided for 
better management of sunsetting regulation by allowing bundling of related 
regulation for review, it does not require primary legislation to be revisited. This 
process is in addition to ad hoc reviews (such as Productivity Commission Inquiries) 
that are a response to current issues that warrant special attention. This systematic 
approach was seen as preferable to regulatory budgets and red tape targets, which 
can result in unintended consequences such as delaying repeal and streamlining to 
bank roll against a need for future regulation, and to avoid repealing necessary 
regulation. 
Sources: PC 2011, 2012.  
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Options for implementing the framework 
Beyond the broader institutional architecture, the implementation of the framework 
requires consideration of the following: 
• Who conducts the audits? 
• How the quality of individual audits is assured? 
• How the audits are used to improve regulator performance and the reduce the 
burdens of regulation more generally? 
In addition, portfolio Ministers of Departments need to have arrangements in place 
to assess regulator’s compliance with relevant Government policies, such as 
obligations in statements of expectations, and completing RISs where regulators are 
developing and implementing regulations in their own right. 
Who should conduct the audits? 
Departmental audits 
One option would be for the relevant departments to take primary responsibility for 
working with the regulator and other stakeholders to develop the audit plan and then 
later conduct the audit. These activities might be undertaken by staff in the newly 
created deregulation divisions within each department. 
A positive of this approach is that it has the potential to minimise costs by 
leveraging the statement of expectations and statement of intent process, and the 
establishment of deregulation units and Ministerial Advisory Councils. It should 
also promote the integration of this audit with audits of other elements of regulator 
performance and reviews of the regulation. On the other hand, there is the potential 
for reduced impartiality and objectiveness (which is particularly important for 
reviews of the regulation), as well as varying degrees of rigour and application 
across departments. 
Regulator self-assessments 
Regulator self-assessment against an agreed audit plan is likely to be feasible in 
some cases. However, some smaller regulators may require assistance to undertake 
this task.  
As with the first model, a limitation of this approach is that there may be reduced 
impartiality and objectiveness, notwithstanding the fact that all vested interests 
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should have been consulted on the indicators and metrics used to assess 
performance and the reports subject to their scrutiny. An external audit process to 
randomly check the reliability of the self-assessment would reduce the incentives 
for bias in self-assessment, as can the publication of the report. 
Specialist audit agency assessments 
A single body or agency, including one specifically established for the task, could 
be tasked with undertaking the development of audit plans (in cooperation with 
each regulator) and their subsequent assessment. This body (the Coalition Policy 
document suggested the OBPR, but ANAO may also be well placed) could be asked 
to consider taking on responsibility for organising each audit and preparing the 
written reports. Such a model might share characteristics with other third party style 
reviews, such as Productivity Commission inquiries, and is similar to the model 
adopted in the UK for reviews of the implementation of the Hampton principles for 
regulator behaviour.  
An advantage of this approach is that audits are conducted by specialist staff in a 
dedicated body, and this may enable a more objective and rigorous approach to the 
audit process. It would also assist in enhancing consistency across audits (albeit, 
subject to appropriate tailoring), enabling better benchmarking and cross regulator 
comparisons.  
A disadvantage of this approach is that it is likely to require substantial new 
resources. (The Hampton reviews in the UK, for instance, used four-person review 
teams with additional staff providing back-room assistance, with each review taking 
a number of months to complete.) Also, it may be somewhat duplicative of other 
audit processes, notwithstanding that the auditors should draw on existing reporting 
as far as possible.  
An alternative is for such a body to provide oversight to the planning and audit 
processes. They could offer expert input in the planning stage, advice for auditors, 
and conduct random or programmed external audits to assess the quality of 
self-audits. Departmental or regulator assessments could be conducted annually 
with less frequent specialist/independent audits, unless the regulator is getting 
negative assessments. It may also be possible for these less frequent audits to be 
integrated into other processes such as ANAO performance audits (which focus on 
administrative efficiency and effectiveness).  
Where businesses are regulated by a number of agencies with interrelated 
requirements, coordination of external audits should be considered to reduce the 
burden imposes on business. 
   
40 REGULATOR AUDIT 
FRAMEWORK 
 
 
Frequency of audits 
The frequency of audits should be determined by the potential gain offered by the 
audit process. All regulators should be required to prepare audit plans based on the 
framework. The frequency of the audit, particularly external audits, should be 
determined on a case by case basis. While annual public self-reporting would be 
appropriate for large regulators that produce annual reports, this may be more 
frequent than required for smaller regulators which do not have a large or diverse 
client base. However, all regulators should be encouraged to self-report on an 
annual basis against at least some of the indicators in their audit plan. These should 
be identified in the plan as those that will best reflect the improvements that matter 
most for the regulated entities. Such annual reporting should not remove the need 
for a full report against the audit plan at an agreed time. 
The need for external verification of self-reports (and departmental reports) or 
external audits will also vary across regulators. Given the resources involved in 
external audit, departments are likely to be able to fund an external audit for only a 
few regulators a year. They should prioritise those that impose the greatest 
compliance costs on business, and/or those where business concerns about regulator 
behaviour are greatest. Good audits that are external or externally verified should 
win an agency a lower audit frequency, but ultimately all regulators should be 
externally audited within a five year period. As mentioned, ideally this audit will be 
included in a broader audit of regulator objectives and outcomes, and departments 
should plan accordingly. 
How is the quality of individual audits assured? 
There are several ways to provide quality assurance of the audit plans and the audit 
reports. The first is formal oversight processes. The second is to use public scrutiny. 
Oversight can be conducted at several levels. One level is to ensure that good 
processes have been followed. This would involve checking that audit plans have 
been developed, and that audits are undertaken and reported as agreed. A 
requirement for audit plans and reports to be posted in a central location, with 
follow-up if they are not, could be adequate to achieve this level of oversight. 
A more involved level would be for the oversight agency to participate as an adviser 
in the development of audit plans and conduct of audits. They could also check the 
final audit report and make an assessment of the adequacy of the audit. In many 
ways this role would be akin to the one the OBPR plays in ensuring the quality of 
departmental ‘Regulation Impact Statements’.  
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Random external audits can also be used to assess the competency of the audit. This 
form of oversight could be achieved by including this ‘compliance cost’ module in 
audits undertaken to assess the achievement of regulatory objectives or other more 
comprehensive audits. 
A complement to formal oversight responsibilities is exposure to public scrutiny. 
By publishing the audit plans and audit reports and providing an opportunity for 
public comment, such scrutiny can provide incentives for honest self-assessment. 
This form of quality assurance requires activist stakeholders, and can be subject to 
abuse by disgruntled people. However, if major costs are being imposed that could 
be reduced by better performance, businesses should have an incentive to monitor 
the audit plans and reports and to report when they perceive that the plans are 
inadequate or the audit falls short of an accurate reflection of regulator behaviour. 
If responsibility for the audits falls to an independent specialist audit agency or 
body, quality control is less likely to require external oversight, although it will be 
important that their audit processes are transparent and inclusive. Public notification 
of the audits, opportunities to provide input from a full range of stakeholders, and 
release of a draft for public comment are key elements to an independent audit 
process. 
Regardless of the approach taken to quality assurance, both audit plans and audit 
reports should be published in a central location for easy access by businesses and 
other stakeholders with an interest in the outcomes. This responsibility could sit 
with the OBPR, and would complement their role as the central source for RISs and 
their associated documents. Public transparency of this nature improves the ability 
of business and other stakeholders to provide feedback or manage their affairs to be 
able to engage most efficiently in consultation. It also provides an incentive for 
regulators to improve their performance. 
How can the audits improve regulator performance?  
The audits can enhance regulator performance through improving their incentives to 
perform well, and through identifying ways in which they can do so. Regulator 
culture is a critical input into performance. Consequently, for the audit framework 
to add the most value it should be targeted at creating a culture that promotes clear 
and effective communication, ensures consistency in all its actions, embraces a 
risk-based approach, practices good governance (accountable and transparent), and 
values continuous improvement.  
The incentives to follow these good practice principles will be strengthened by 
institutional arrangements that set up formal obligations for regulators to account 
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for and publicly report on their performance. A Ministerial letter of expectations 
and regulator statement of intent, with rewards and sanctions, can be one such 
mechanism. To the extent that audits identify ‘room for improvement’ in individual 
regulators it will be important that some mechanism exists that helps the regulator 
determine how to improve. The use of diagnostic indicators can assist in pointing to 
the required area for improvement. Regulators may be able to develop their own 
improvement strategies, but some may require assistance. This may be in the nature 
of advice, but may also require investments in new technology and/or staff training. 
As in all such situations, the benefits of change will need to exceed the costs of 
making the change.  
There can also be an opportunity for the audits to add to the knowledge base of 
what works well. To the extent that audits highlight regulator strategies and 
practices that are particularly successful in avoiding unnecessary burden on 
businesses and achieving regulatory objectives most efficiently, having a 
mechanism to encourage wider adoption of these practices would assist to improve 
the overall performance of regulators.  
Benchmarking against other regulators can also provide an incentive for regulators 
to improve their performance. It also allows for the overall achievements and 
improvements in the performance of regulators across portfolios and overall to be 
assessed. The framework sets out five main principles and four areas of regulator 
activity that form a summary matrix for each regulator that could be used to 
compare how different regulators are performing. This could be done using a traffic 
light type system to indicate excellent (green), satisfactory (amber), and 
unsatisfactory (red) performance in each part of the matrix. Such an analysis would 
allow for easy identification of areas with common underperformance, where a 
more systemic approach to improving regulator performance may be warranted. 
The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, which has oversight of the 
Government’s deregulation agenda, could draw on the regulator audits to report on 
progress in reducing compliance costs to business. They are also best placed to 
oversee action on regulations themselves in response to feedback received in the 
audit reports. In some cases this may be directing departments to review 
regulations, in others it could be providing advice to regulators on the scope they 
have to redesign the regulatory approach to improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the regulation. Independent regulators may need amendments to their governing 
legislation and/or charters if these constrain their ability to take a risk-based and 
efficient approach to achieving the objectives of the regulation they administer. 
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